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The Audit Committee "Financial Expert"
Requirement and the Internal Control
Attestation: Effective Contributions
to Corporate Governance?
Joseph A. Guillory'
N light of recent corporate reforms promulgated by Congress, the Se-
curities & Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and the national securities
exchanges, increased emphasis has been placed on corporate governance,
committee structure, and the qualifications of board members. 2 The role of
board committees has been thrust into the limelight and perhaps the most
important of these committees is the audit committee, which is charged
with oversight of the entire financial reporting process. 3 While most board
members have historically been closely related to the senior executives of
the corporation,4 often with financial or personal ties, the audit committee
has now been identified as an ideally autonomous body.5 In order to escape
the influence of management, the audit committee must be entirely "inde-
pendent," as defined in the various rules of the SEC and the self-regulated
organizations ("SROs") or national securities exchanges such as the NYSE
and NASDAQ.6 The independent members of the audit committee cannot
receive any remuneration other than fees for committee service.7 Addition-
ally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley") 8 requires listed
companies to certify in their periodic reporting whether or not at least one
i J.D. 2006, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S., Georgetown College, 2000;
Certified Public Accountant, Commonwealth of Kentucky. The author would like to thank
his parents and sister for their love, support, and inspiration, as well as Professor Rutheford B
Campbell for his assistance in formulating the topic for this note.
2 See infra notes 34-69 and accompanying text.
3 See Andrew F. Kirkendall, Filling in the GAAP: Will the Sarbanes-Oxley Ac Protect Investors
from Corporate Malfeasance and Restore Confidence in the Securities Market?, 56 SMU L. REv. 2303,
2310 (2003).
4 J. Loewenstein, The SECandthe Future ofCorporate Governance, 45 AA._ L. REV. 783, 786
(emphasizing how upper management remains largely in control of Board positions).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.JoA-2(m)(3)(A) (2005).
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.ioA-2 (2005).
7 Laurence Goldfein & David Cace, What a Buyer Must Know About Sarbanes-Oxley,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS JOURNAL, November 21, 2002.
8 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; see also infra notes
22-26 and accompanying text.
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member of their audit committee meets specified criteria to qualify as an
"Audit Committee Financial Expert," or ACFE.9The SROs, ° although not
explicitly requiring a member to meet such set criteria, also indicate that
members of the audit committee must possess a higher level of financial
literacy or practical experience than was required in the past." It is hoped
that these more well-qualified individuals will be able to spot potential
financial misstatements earlier and act with increased oversight and skepti-
cism in their review of the financial reporting processes of the company and
its senior executives.l
2
Collectively, these requirements have driven corporations to seek out
well-qualified, independent individuals for their audit committees who
hold advanced degrees, professional certifications, or high levels of rel-
evant industry experience in order to satisfy the new standards.' 3 Such
credentials are definitely (or at least arguably) desirable in all corporate
committee members. However, in the race to comply with the flurry of
new regulations, corporations appear to have focused more on bare compli-
ance than on the underlying goals of the ACFE requirement.' 4 As the new
rules are proven through application, refinements will likely be necessary.' 5
At least one scholar has proposed that emphasis should be shifted from a
token requirement for one "super-expert" to a more balanced approach
evaluating audit committee members not only on objective quantitative
factors but on criteria more focused on the overarching goal of the audit
committee-monitoring. 
6
9 15 U.S.C.S. § 7265 (2oo5).
1o The SROs, including the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association
of Securities Dealers, among others, are quasi-regulatory bodies empowered by the SEC to
develop and implement market regulations for securities traded within these exchanges. See
Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2 X 2 Games of International Securities Regulations, 24
Yale J. Int'l L. 61 8o (1999).
it See NASD Manual Marketplace Rules § 435o(d)(2)(A)(i); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company
Manual §3o3A.o7(a) cmt. (2006), availableathttp:l/www.nasdaq.com/about/MarketPlaceRules.
stm (last visited Feb. 28, 2oo6) and http://www.nyse.com (last visited Feb. z8, zoo6).
12 Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate
Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MIcH. ST. L. REV. 327, 426 (2004) (emphasizing the
"surveillance" and oversight aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley).
13 Stephen A. Scarpati, CPAs As Audit Committee Members, J. AccT., Sept. 2003, at 32.
14 J. Michael Cook, Addressing Audit Committee Concerns: Balancing Relationships with
the Audit Committee, Management, and the External Auditors, t449 PLI/Corp 1025, 1031 (2004)
(discussing how in meeting the compliance requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, there is a danger
of "becoming ritualistic, distracting us from doing the things that are substantive and truly
important").
15 Backer, supra note 12, at 354 (purporting that Sarbanes-Oxley is likely "not the last
word" in new regulations).
16 Id. at 366 (discussing the critical role of oversight and monitoring of the audit
committee).
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Another aspect of corporate governance reform that is critical to the
success of these more well-rounded and enabled audit committees is an
increased emphasis on a corporation's internal control structure.' 7 Internal
controls are a corporation's own processes, systems, and safeguards that are
designed to facilitate the timely and accurate processing of transactions
and the reporting of financial and management results both internally and
externally.'8 This system of internal "checks and balances" has always been
an item of interest for auditors, regulators, and corporate efficiency experts,
but it has not received a great deal of attention from the general investing
public. 19 However, the corporate frauds of recent years have largely been
the result of breakdowns in these systems of application processing and
high-level monitoring.2° Thus, internal controls are finally receiving their
due attention as an invaluable first-line of defense against management
fraud, collusion, and false financial reporting.2I The major difficulty arises,
however, because systems of internal control in a traditional accounting
environment are designed and controlled by members of management
themselves who may take advantage of opportunities to engineer creative
loopholes or special exceptions to the rules.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404 deals with this, however, by re-
quiring an annual certification by management, attested to by an indepen-
dent accountant, that effective systems of internal control are in place and
operating effectively to prevent or detect any material misstatement in the
financial statements.22 In addition to the independent external audit of the
financial statements that has long been required for public companies un-
der the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 this "section 404 attestation" re-
quires management to design, document, and test their system of controls
for operating effectiveness. This internally conducted documentation of
control systems is then, in effect, subjected to its own external audit-like
procedures by the independent public accountants.2 4 The audit committee
17 See Kirkendall, supra note 3, at 2310 (discussing the design and implementation of
effective internal controls as a key element of high-quality financial reporting).
18 ALVIN A. ARENS & JAMES K. LOEBBECKE, AUDITING: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 290 (7th
ed. 1997).
19 See William 0. Fisher, Where Were the Counselors? Reflections on Advice Not Given and
the Rok of Attorneys in the Accounting Crisis, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 29, 90 (Zo3-04) (discussing how
internal controls are "virtually, an accounting term of art" and not widely understood).
20 Jonathan R. Macey, A POX on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbans-Oxley and the Debate
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 8I WASH. U. L. Q. 329, 332
(2003).
21 See Fisher, supra note i9, at 91 (discussing the SEC's adoption of internal control
attestation requirements as part of recent corporate reforms).
22 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2oo2, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 404, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (I 16 Stat.)
745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. § 7262 (2005)).
23 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m (2oo6).
24 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 404,2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.)
2005- 2oo6 ]
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is given exclusive and independent power to retain, evaluate, compensate,
and communicate with the external auditors as a full delegation of corporate
authority.25 This requirement necessarily involves the independent audit
committee in the internal control process although at a somewhat removed
degree from the process of actually designing and implementing the com-
pany's controls. 6 This appears to be another area in which the new rules
may eventually be "tweaked" once experience is gained in practice. The
independent audit committee, consistent with its charge of monitoring the
actions of management to ensure that the shareholders' best interests are
protected, should be more involved in the detailed design and examination
of the system of internal controls on the most basic level. This involvement
of the audit committee, although a major task, is likely to provide a greater
cost-benefit for the shareholders in terms of effective monitoring. Strong
internal controls, when closely examined and applied by the independent
audit committee, can provide an efficient and effective method of monitor-
ing management's transaction processing and financial reporting systems
from the ground up.
This Note begins with a survey of the new requirements concerning
audit committee financial literacy and the internal control attestation, com-
paring the salient features of Congressional and SEC authorities with the
applicable SRO listing standards. Part I focuses on the various require-
ments for audit committee member qualifications.2 7 The implications of
these requirements as applied in practical experience are also discussed.
Part II then examines the importance of the internal controls attestation,
considering the use of such methods in other specialized industries. s Part
II also analyzes the effectiveness of both of these provisions within an in-
tegrated corporate governance framework. Finally, suggestions are offered
to re-focus the efforts of regulators and corporate committee members on
implementing these requirements with a more comprehensive emphasis
on the fundamental goals of the audit committee as a monitoring body.
These suggestions embody the spirit of recent corporate reforms, while
calling for more practical and effective methods of implementation.
745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. § 7262 (2005)).
25 17 C.ER. § 240.ioA-3 (2005).
26 Sarbanes-Oxley stops short of actually requiring the audit committee itself to design
control systems from the ground up, as this job is still left to management. However, in their
monitoring role over the independent accountants, the audit committee obtains a sort of
derivative responsibility to ensure that internal controls are in place and operating effectively.
See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7262, 7241 (2005).
27 See infra notes 29-88 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 89-141 and accompanying text.
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I. AUDIT COMMITTEE "FINANCIAL EXPERT" REQUIREMENTS
The cornerstone goal of an audit committee, inabstract terms, is the effec-
tive and efficient monitoring of corporate finance and accounting systems.
29
Closely intertwined with other functions of the business, the accounting
function is a fundamental internal mechanism designed to systematically
provide accurate and timely information regarding the results of operations
and the status of the corporation's financial health.3 The audit committee
should be an independent body acting omnisciently and without interfer-
ence to ensure that this machinery is working properly.
3'
This goal is achieved largely through two main approaches: the audit
function (both internal and external) and the internal control/risk assess-
ment structure. 32 Both of these tasks are within the purview and control
of the modern audit committee. The SEC and the national securities ex-
changes have introduced strict requirements for membership on the audit
committee in order to effectively carry out and monitor these functions in
order to protect the interests of the investing public. 33
A. Securities and Exchange Commission Requirements
Many of the SEC's new requirements were implemented as a result of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was passed in the wake of corpo-
rate frauds propagated at firms such as Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and
Tyco. Sarbanes-Oxley ushered in dramatic changes to the regulation of the
public accounting industry, a multitude of new reporting requirements for
publicly traded companies, and even governmentally mandated corporate
governance structures for listed companies.34 Among such requirements, as
detailed below, is the mandate that at least one member of the audit com-
mittee be a "financial expert," as defined by largely quantitative criteria set
forth in the applicable regulations relating to financial literacy and work
experience. 3s As an integrated part of the SEC's Regulation S-K, this obli-
gation applies to all publicly traded corporations subject to the periodic re-
29 See Backer, supra note 12, at 426 (emphasizing a duty of "suspicion" in overseeing the
system of monitoring to "ferret out wrongdoing").
30 Arens & Loebbecke, supra note 18, at 4
31 Id. at 366 (discussing the critical role of oversight and monitoring of the audit
committee).
32 Kirkendall, supra note 3, at 2310-1I (describing internal controls as a method to
prevent problems before they begin," in contrast to the independent audit, characterized as
a "public watchdog" to catch errors once they have occurred).
33 See infra notes 34-69.
34 See infra notes 34-69 and accompanying text.
35 SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.ER. § 229.401(h)(I)(i) (2005).
2005- 2oo6 ]
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porting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.36 The ACFE
requirement has created a frenzy among corporate boards, as they search
for well-qualified individuals to satisfy the financial expert requirement,
among other new rules. 37 Certainly if all audit committees-or corporate
boards for that matter-were composed solely of "financial experts" who
held advanced degrees in finance or accounting and had served as auditors,
CFOs, or SEC investigators, such members would be well-suited to moni-
tor and guide the audit and internal controls functions. However, the func-
tion of the audit committee, armed with the ability to independently retain
counsel and other experts to advise them in the conduct of their duties,
3s
is to monitor the functions of the corporation, not necessarily to be able to
conduct or understand each and every transaction themselves.
In the rush to meet the "financial expert" requirement, it appears that
the overall monitoring goal of the audit committee has fallen out of fo-
cus. The existence of an ACFE on the committee, in and of itself, does
little to further the goal of effective monitoring of the corporate report-
ing functions. 39 This requirement, although representative of good inten-
tions for reform, appears to have been implemented in the haste to enact
stronger corporate governance regulations without sufficient analysis of the
cost-benefit relation to an overall structure of effective monitoring. The
effectiveness of an audit committee still depends in large part upon the
personal commitment of all committee members to uphold their duties to
the shareholders regardless of whether one member can check off quantita-
tive criteria for SEC reporting purposes.
In conjunction with the myriad other reforms (not detailed here) con-
cerning audit committee composition and responsibilities is the require-
ment that each company subject to the periodic reporting requirements of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have at least one "Audit Committee
Financial Expert." 40 Embodied originally in section 407 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the requirement forces each issuer to disclose in their annual
Form io-K whether the Board has determined that at least one member of
the Audit Committee meets the specified requirements to be deemed an
ACFE. 4' If the Board cannot make this certification, such fact must be dis-
closed along with the qualifications and attributes of the Committee's other
members.42 Specific criteria that must be satisfied to qualify as an ACFE are
36 Id.
37 Jenny Anderson, Going Overboard-Directors Getting More $ as Workload Grows, N.Y.
PosT, Aug. 25, 2003, at 29.
38 Scarpati, supra note 13, at 34.
39 Cook, supra note 14, at 1031-32.
40 SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.ER. § 22 9 .4 01(h)(i)(i) (2005).
41 15 U.S.C.S. § 7265(a) (zoo5).
42 SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.ER. § 22 9 .4 01(h)(i)(iii) (2005).
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set forth in Regulation S-K, falling into several overall categories.43 First,
the member must possess an understanding of generally accepted account-
ing principles and the major financial statements (balance sheet, income
statement, and statement of cash flow), as well as how these statements
relate and apply to the issuer's individual business and industry.4 Special
attention must be paid to any unique or specialized financial instruments,
transactions, or accounting methods (such as statutory insurance company
accounting).4s The ACFE must have developed and demonstrated this
knowledge through actual practical experience in preparing, auditing, or
evaluating financial statements with a level of complexity similar to that of
the issuer, or through the supervision of others conducting such activities.
46
Additionally, the member must have a thorough understanding of internal
controls and both the internal and external financial reporting and audit
processes, demonstrating the underlying goals of an audit committee and
its role in effective corporate governance.
47
It is important to note that these requirements cannot be met part-
and-parcel by several different committee members; one single member
must hold all the necessary qualifications.4s However, the member's experi-
ence in the preparation or auditing of financial statements may be satisfied
through the supervision, review, or analysis of such statements. 9 Although
the most likely candidates to fill these positions are former auditors and
CFOs-individuals likely to be certified public accountants or hold ad-
vanced degrees with relevant work experience-other industry experts
such as investment bankers and attorneys could likely also qualify. These
individuals may be able to satisfy the requirements through experience
gained in examining and reviewing financial statements and company in-
ternal control systems from an outside perspective5s The SEC rules thus
provide a fair amount of flexibility in meeting the requirements, although
little (if any) additional work is required of an ACFE once their status is
disclosed. s' Once the mere existence of an ACFE is noted in the company's
reports, there are no other mandated responsibilities specified for this indi-
vidual. Yet, the market for qualified individuals is fierce with some capable
individuals declining invitations to serve as an ACFE because of currently
43 SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.40I(h)(2) (2005).
44Id.
45 Scarpati, supra note 13, at 33-
46 SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.40I(h)(2)(iii) (2005).
47 SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.FR. § 229.401(h)(2) (2005).
48 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Act Release No. 33-8177,68 Fed.
Reg. 51 1o n. 24 (2003).
49 Id.
50 Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Act Release No. 33-8177 §
II(A)(4)(d), 68 Fed. Reg. 51 jon. 24 (2003).
5' Id.
2005- 2oo6 ]
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unresolved questions regarding responsibility and liability.52 This obviates
the weaknesses in the new regulations to be analyzed below, questioning
their direct relation and impact upon the primary goal of effective monitor-
ing by the audit committee.
B. National Securities Exchanges Requirements
The national securities exchanges, or self-regulated organizations ("SROs"),
have followed suit by amending their own listing standards and regulations
to reflect new audit committee composition requirements as detailed be-
low. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorized the SEC to work in conjunction
with the SROs to implement such standards.5 3 Under the listing standards
for both the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations ("NASDAQ") sys-
tem, audit committees must be composed of at least three independent
members.5 4 Independence guidelines, a major subject of discussion and
controversy, are not detailed here. Yet, in summary, the committee mem-
bers must be free of financial and personal conflicts with management and
the issuer and be otherwise unrelated to the company.55 Additionally, all
audit committees must adopt and annually review and affirm an audit com-
mittee charter5 6 This document affirmatively sets forth the committee's
purpose and how it relates to monitoring the company in the best interests
of the shareholders.5 7 The charter should also denominate procedures for
an annual evaluation of the committee's members and their work.5s Guide-
lines for retaining and communicating with internal and external auditors
must also be included.S9 The NYSE limits an audit committee member's
ability to serve for multiple issuers. One individual cannot simultaneously
serve on more than three audit committees for public companies without
disclosure of such facts in the companies' proxy statements.' ° Also, an af-
52 Cook, supra note 14, at 1031.
53 15 U.S.C.S. § 780-6 (2005).
54 NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 435o(d)(2) (2oo4); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company
Manual § 303.0I(B)(2)(a) (2004).
55 NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 42oo(a)(15) (2005); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company
Manual § 303.0(B)(2) (2004).
56 NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 435o(d)(1) (2004); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company
Manual § 303A.07(c) (2004).
57 NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 435o(d)(i) (2004); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company
Manual § 303A.07(c) (2006).
58 NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 435o(d)(I) (2004); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company
Manual § 303A.07(c)(ii) (2oo6).
59 NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 435o(d)(3) (zoo4); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company
Manual § 303A.07(c)(iii)(F-G) (2006).
60 NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.07(a) cmt. (2006).
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firmative analysis must be completed by each of the respective boards of
directors concluding that the member can still serve effectively despite the
multiple commitments. 6' Other requirements vary only slightly between
the exchanges, as noted below.
For companies traded on the NYSE, audit committee members must
be "financially literate" or acquire such literacy within a reasonable time
after their appointment to the committee.62 At least one member must have
"expertise" in accounting or related financial management.63 The NYSE
listing standards explicitly allow a Board to presume that an audit com-
mittee member meeting the SEC's definition of an ACFE will satisfy the
exchange requirements, thus impliedly incorporating the SEC standards
by reference. 64 '
Similar requirements have been included in the NASDAQ Listed
Company Manual. An ACFE per se is not required, although all members
of the audit committee must be able to read and understand the issuer's
financial statements.65 Additionally, at least one member must possess previ-
ous employment experience in accounting or finance, hold a professional
certification therein, or have other comparable experience such as serving
as an executive officer with financial oversight responsibilities. 66 This re-
quirement appears to be the functional equivalent of an ACFE although
not termed as such.
67
Curiously absent from both the NYSE and NASDAQ standards are any
more detailed or explicit criteria for meeting the financial expert qualifi-
cations. This represents a departure from the highly structured, specific,
and formulaic SEC rules under Sarbanes-Oxley. Although the SROs' ap-
proach may seem to offer less guidance, it appears to be more focused on
the broader goals of the audit committee by allowing the issuer and its
shareholders to make the determination of what qualifications are most
desirable. Rather than recruiting an audit committee member solely with
an eye to the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley section 407, the listing stan-
dards appear to allow a more holistic evaluation of needed attributes once
a basic threshold of financial literacy is satisfied.
The focus of the listing standards on more qualitative factors may be
due at least in part to the redundancy for most issuers of the listing stan-
6I See New Corporate-Governance Listing Standards, KPMG's DEFINING ISSUES, No. 03-24,
Nov. 2003, at 3, available at http://www.fei.org/download/Defininglssues-I i_OO3.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2005).
6z NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 3o3A.07(a) cmt. (2oo6).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 4350(d)(2)(A)(iv) (2004).
66 Id.
67 Id.
2oo5-2oo6]
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dards with the SEC regulations. 68 It could be expected that the SRO list-
ing standards would be more stringent than the SEC rules, as they largely
would apply to a smaller sub-set of companies, although this has not been
the case. 69 The listing standards appear to have adopted a "wait and see"
attitude by avoiding radical immediate change, thus allowing the federal
regulations to be refined and inevitably revised as listed companies, the
SEC, and the investing public adapt through practical experience and
implementation.
C. Effectiveness of the ACFE Requirements
The intentions behind the "financial expert" requirement are quite genu-
ine, and financial literacy and a higher-than-average level of business so-
phistication should be expected on corporate boards and especially on
audit committees. That said, perhaps the new "expert" requirements are
best viewed as a first step or as a wake-up call to corporate boards hear-
kening increased expectations for accountability in the future. Reaching
beyond the traditional responsibilities of the committee, members should
become more involved in the overall governance structure of the company,
including overseeing ethics programs. 70 Companies should broaden their
focus, seeking to fill all of their audit committee and board positions with
people who have a thorough understanding of the financial statements
and the company's financial situation. 7' While the ACFE requirements at-
tempt to quantify these attributes through set criteria, ideally no single
factor should control. Special attention should be given where an issuer
has particularly complex or intricate operations or financial instruments, is
subject to specialized statutory accounting requirements, or is involved in
higher-risk industries or financial transactions.7 Although evaluating a po-
tential committee member's ability to monitor management, auditors, and
internal controls on a holistic level is more ethereal and difficult to quantify,
corporate boards should seek to develop methods identifying candidates
well suited for these tasks.73 Unique characteristics of each issuing corpo-
68 If a corporation is listed for trading on the NYSE or NASDAQ, by definition it must
also comply with the SEC's periodic reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as it is "publicly traded." 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m (zoo6).
69 As some companies that are subject to the SEC's reporting requirements are not traded
on a national exchange, the exchange requirements encompass a smaller subset of companies
within the universe of "34 Act Companies."
70 Cook, supra note 14, at 1032.
71 Fisher, supra note 19, at 41.
72 Rob Rock & Molly Butler Hart, Turnaround Topic: Improving the Effectiveness of Audit
Committees, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (May 1999) (discussing how the committee should as-
sess and pay particular attention to areas where there is a high risk of fraudulent financial
reporting).
73 Fisher, supra note 19, at 41 (discussing how boards should seek out audit committee
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ration should be considered in the process, as optimal qualifications will
inevitably be different for each company. There may not be an objective,
checklist-type method to verify that an audit committee member complies
with these requirements, but governance structures can be tailored such
that members are closely evaluated and held accountable on a regular basis.
Although individual evaluations of this sort may be less efficient than ob-
jective universal criteria, corporate boards and shareholders will gain more
flexibility to adopt standards most beneficial to their situations.
These new requirements for membership on an audit committee have
resulted in massive shifts in board composition.74 Particularly, section 407
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and, generally, parallel requirements in
the SRO listing standards require that at least one "financial expert" be on
each audit committee. 7s As noted above, interpretation of this requirement
has varied widely. However, in a rush to fill their audit committees with
financial wizards who could single-handedly prepare and audit the most
complex financial statements, many corporate boards appear to have lost
sight of the goal and impetus underlying this requirement.76 In seeking to
comply with the letter of the law in meeting this requirement, the primary
purpose has been subsumed.7 7 "Checking boxes and signing things won't
solve integrity problems," remarked one foreign CEO.78 In taking a step
back, the overarching goal of the audit committee is to effectively monitor
the financial structures of a corporation, but not necessarily to understand
every minute detail79 Granted, a fundamental comprehension of accounting
and finance is greatly desirable and should not be understated. However, is
the heightened "expert" requirement practical, and does it necessarily con-
tribute to a more efficient and effective oversight of the financial systems of
a corporation? Admittedly, a committee member with expertise in finance
may be held to a higher standard of care than one without such knowledge,
but this principle had been recognized long before the current corporate
reforms.8o A committee member who is named the ACFE is not necessarily
subject to any additional fiduciary liability simply as a consequence of his
or her designation.' The supposed additional knowledge and abilities of
members who do more than just satisfy the minimum exchange requirements).
74 See generally Rock & Hart, supra note 72.
75 15 U.S.C.S. § 7265 (2005); NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 435o(d)(2)(A) (2004);
NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.07(a) cmt. (2oo6).
76 Cook, supra note 14, at 1031.
77 Id.
78 Backer, supra note 12, at 43o .
79 George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 57 SMU L. REV. 1207, 1224 (2004).
8o Id. at 1224 (discussing how SEC regulations protect an AFCE from "expert" status
under the Federal securities laws, a standard implicating a higher duty of care for opinions of
lawyers and accountants).
81 Id.
2oo5-zoo6]
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this member, therefore, do not seem to correlate to any increased respon-
sibilities or tangible expectations1S Additionally, the potential liability of
other members of the committee is not diminished because they are not
the resident "expert."3 Sarbanes-Oxley and its related reforms may best be
viewed as an effort to integrate a system of corporate discipline on all lev-
els, including all members of all corporate committees. The reforms repre-
sent increased governmental involvement in order to effectively supervise
the supervisors.4 Yet, the singling-out of one member of the audit commit-
tee for special qualification appears contrary to the goal of raising standards
across the board. Certainly, the other committee members may look toward
the ACFE for insights and advice, which the expert should be fully able to
provide, but does merely having such an "expert" engender undue reliance
upon their advice by the other members of the board? Gratuitous reliance
of this sort may actually result in lower decision-making standards being ap-
plied by other committee members. These non-expert members may place
such a high level of dependence upon the expert's advice that they dero-
gate their own duties to investigate and make informed decisions. Consid-
ering more normative factors for effective corporate governance, this risk
of placing too much trust in and becoming overconfident with the opinions
of the ACFE supports the proposition that financial literacy should be em-
phasized for all committee members, considering more normative factors
for effective corporate governance.
D. Costs of Compliance
Compliance with the new standards has not come cheaply. It has been es-
timated that regulatory compliance costs have increased by almost ninety
percent for some public companies following Sarbanes-Oxley.5 In order to
attract qualified individuals who are willing to take on the increased scru-
tiny placed on corporate governance officers after Sarbanes-Oxley, director
compensation has risen dramatically' s However, the high costs of increased
integrity and accuracy in financial statements may pale in comparison to
the costs of corruption, corporate failures, and stunted economic growth.8 7
The specific authorization of the audit committee to hire outside indepen-
dent counsel and other experts indicates in part that the AFCE does not
8z Id.
83 Id.
84 Backer, supra note 12, at 333-34.
85 Beth Marlin, New Business as Firms Go Private: There's Increasing Action as Stiffer
Regulations Cause Some Companies to Withdraw From the Public Arena, FINANCIAL POST, Jan. 5,
2005 at FPIo, zoo5 WL 59967969 (2005).
86 Backer, supra note 12, at 339.
87 Editorial, The High Cost of Corruption; Rigged Markets, as Well as Regulation, Can Hurt
Growth, Bus NEss WEEK, Nov. 29, 2oo4 at 156, 2004 WL 96442870 (2004).
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have to rely entirely on his or her own knowledge or bear the entire burden
of solving corporate problems. The entire committee can confer with spe-
cialists to gain a further understanding of specific transactions or financial
statement amounts when it is appropriate to do so.B Although the financial
literacy requirement is certainly desirable, and a more than cursory under-
standing of accounting and finance should be expected from all corporate
board members, compliance with the new requirement is not conclusive of
"better" corporate oversight, and it does not necessarily guarantee that an
audit committee can properly and efficiently accomplish its charged func-
tion of effective oversight and monitoring.
II. THE INTERNAL CONTROL ATTESTATION REQUIREMENT
As its name implies, one primary function of the audit committee is coor-
dination of the internal and external audit functions. These critical safe-
guards provide independent and objective verification that a corporation's
financial statements are free from material misstatements. 89 Although the
importance of the audit function itself has been specifically cast into the
limelight following recent corporate frauds,90 it is not the primary object of
analysis here. The recent corporate reforms appear to signal a metamorpho-
sis of the audit committee's responsibilities to include broader objectives.
Such reforms also represent an increased emphasis on existing functions
of the committee that have been overlooked in the past, namely corporate
governance policies.9' The retention, communication with, and evaluation
of the external auditors has previously been hailed as the audit committee's
most important role and should not be diminished. 92 However, coexistent
with this goal should be more ex ante safeguards to accomplish effective and
efficient monitoring of the company's financial reporting systems through a
robust system of internal controls. The internal control system, encompass-
ing the firm's internal processes, structures, and checks and balances, is a
fundamental predicate of reliable financial information, which has been his-
torically relegated to a position of lesser importance. 93 However, as break-
88 See generally Goldfein & Cace, supra note 7.
89 ARENS & LOEBBECKE, supra note 18, at 142.
90 See generally Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty of Obstruction, SAN DIEGO UNION-
ThIBUNE, Jun. 16, 2002, at Ai; Paul Waldie, WorldCom, Andersen Trade Blame, GLOBE AND MAIL,
July 9, 2002, at Bi; Jill Zuckman, Senate Takes Up Billto Monitor Accounting Firms, CHi. TRIn.,
July 9, 2002; David Willis, Management Reports on Internal Controls, ]. Accr., 57 (zooo); Heesun
Wee, Enron in Perfect Hindsight, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 19, 2001.
91 Cook, supra note 14, at 1O3O.
92 GEGRGE H. BODNAR & WILLIAM S. HOPWOOD, ACCOUNTING INFORMATION SYSTEMS 175
(6th ed. 1995).
93 Fisher, supra note 19, at 9o-91.
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downs have occurred, the need for increased scrutiny of a company's own
internal processes-and more importantly, the proper functioning of such
systems-has become evident. 94 Controls focus on all levels of transaction
processing and reporting from management's oversight to the lowest-level
employee's processing of orders and invoices.9s Viewed as a close ally of the
external audit, strong internal controls can aid in preventing errors or mis-
statements-or at least detecting them at an earlier stage even before an
audit may reveal them-by addressing the company's exposure to specific
risks of inaccurate or fraudulent financial reporting.96 The frauds perpe-
trated at Enron were not discovered before it was too late, and investors
and employees had already borne the greatest share of the losses. 97 Internal
controls, if effectively implemented and properly operated, can provide an
affirmative immunization to misstatements (proactive prevention), rather
than the after-the-fact damage control that may be necessary after errors
are revealed through a substantive audit (reactive correction).
A comprehensive system of internal controls allows a corporation to fo-
cus its resources on areas of higher risk such as complex transactions, ac-
cruals, or estimates. 9s Multiple levels of review in various remote branches
and levels of the corporate hierarchy can take advantage of the redundant
corporate bureaucracy to prevent even highly collusive frauds. 99 These
strong defenses can provide the most effective offensive protection against
potential fraud and misstatement.
Assessment and testing procedures covering internal control structures
have been conducted by external and internal auditors for many years.
However, the analysis of these systems has largely been limited to the
purpose of obtaining "audit comfort" by allowing auditors to place more
reliance upon the actual numbers and figures produced by an accounting
94 Vaughn K. Reynolds, The Ciigroup and J.P Morgan Chase Enron Settlements: The Impact
on the FinancialServices Industry, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 247,251-56 (discussing how settlements
entered into by J.P. Morgan and Citigroup with the SEC after Enron required a strengthening
of management's internal risk control policies).
95 Backer, supra note 12, at 343 (discussing increased emphasis on all employees as cor-
porate actors contributing to the goal of accurate financial reporting).
96 BODNAR & HOPWOOD, supra note 92, at 177.
97 The huge losses suffered by individual investors called great attention to the post-
hoc nature of the traditional audit. See S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
I07TH CONG., OVERSIGHT HEARING ON ACCOUNTING AND INVESTOR PROTECTION ISSUES RAISED
n ENRON AND OTHER COMPANIES (2002) (providing the statement of Shaun O'Malley, former
Chair, Price Waterhouse LLP, regarding the failing of all safeguards until it was "too late to
repair the damage.").
98 James Roth and Donald Espersen, The Matrix Revisited, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Aug. I,
2oO4, at 87.
99 H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at i8 (2OO2) (discussing how Sarbanes-Oxley was engineered
to close loopholes in the existing securities laws).
IOO Arens & Loebbecke, supra note I8, at 301.
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system, thus requiring less substantive testing and vouching of the un-
derlying transactions themselves.101 Therefore, the assessment of internal
controls has been much more of a means to an end (the opinion on the
fair presentation of the financial statements) than an independent goal or
object by which to judge good corporate governance and promote fair fi-
nancial reporting. 102
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS") are the industry
rules developed and adopted by auditors, through the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), to guide substantive audit pro-
cedures. 0 3 Statement of Auditing Standards Number 6I ("SAS 61") sets
forth required communications between the independent auditors and the
audit committee.104 Included in the requirements are discussions of any
changes in accounting principles or management estimates used in prepar-
ing the financial statements, adjustments recorded or waived based upon
substantive audit procedures, and any disagreements or difficulties encoun-
tered during the conduct of the audit.105 These items represent the bare
minimum areas of interest that an audit committee should expect to be ad-
dressed by their auditors, and are intended to be supplemented as needed
through the professional business judgment of both the auditors and the
audit committee members.'06 Special attention should be placed on matters
concerning internal control problems or suggestions.107 In the WorldCom
bankruptcy proceedings, it was alleged that the Company's audit commit-
tee failed to sufficiently gain an understanding of the Company's internal
financial structure' and failed to communicate effectively with their audi-
tor, Arthur Anderson.'09 Effective monitoring and communication with the
external auditors was lacking, and the audit committee failed to sufficiently
educate themselves concerning the corporation's own finances.11° Both of
these weaknesses represented breakdowns in the overall functions of the
audit committee. Further, Statement of Auditing Standards Number 99
iot Larry Kudlow, 2oo4 Current Financial Reporting Issues Conference, FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE WIRE, Nov. 8, 2004 (discussing how auditors have previously gained knowledge
about controls primarily to issue their opinion on the financial statements, not for the purpose
of evaluating the actual controls themselves).
102 Id.
I03 ARENS & LOEBBECKE,supra note 18, at 17-18
104 See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, Statements on Auditing Standards No.
61 (2004).
105 Id.
Io6 Id.
107 Id.
io8 In re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 336 F Supp. 2d 310,314 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
1o9 In re Worldcom Inc. Securities Litigation, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21363, at *II
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. I, 2003).
io Id.
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("SAS 99") specifically addresses fraud found in connection with the finan-
cial statement audit, effectively imposing even higher obligations on both
the external auditors and the audit committee when fraud is suspected.",
SAS 99, which became operative in 2002, effectively codified an emerg-
ing trend in auditing by calling for increased professional skepticism and
questioning of management assertions and control processes." 2 However,
even the most thorough audit may not be able to detect all management
fraud or collusion, as the impetus of the audit opinion is limited to the fair
presentation of the financial statements, and the auditor cannot be held as
an "insurer" of accuracy in management's financial reporting."13 Corporate
fraud may occur in ways that may not have a direct material effect on the
financial statement amounts.' '4 Yet, the recent reforms reflected in SAS 99
indicate a broadening of the auditor's responsibility to detect management
fraud or illegal acts even to the extent that they may not materially im-
pact the financial statement amounts. This standard recognizes that such
acts have a direct bearing on management's internal control structure and
integrity and therefore impact the core foundations of fair financial report-
ing. ' s Potential primary liability of auditors under the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Acts is another driving force to increase scrutiny on their
procedures.1
6
With the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, internal controls have been
increasingly recognized as an important element of the overall functioning
of the accounting system."17 Section 404 requires that management assess
and test their own internal control procedures and that registered compa-
nies obtain an attestation by external public accountants that such controls
are in place and operating effectively."" It has been suggested that this
emphasis on controls is somewhat late in coming considering the role of
I I I See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (2002).
112 Lee Berton, Auditors Face Stiffer Rules for Finding, Reporting Fraudat Client Companies,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A2.
113 ARENS & LOEBBECKE, supra note 18, at 142.
114 Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal, Auditors Whistl an Unhappy Tune, 75 DENY. U. L.
REV. 419,438 (1998).
i15 Larry Backer, The Duty to Monitor. Emerging Obligations of Outside Lawyers andAuditors
to Detect and Report Corporate Wrongdoing Beyond the Federal Securities Laws, 77 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 919, 963 (2003).
116 See id. at 985; see also Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 5 1i
U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that aiding and abetting fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities is no longer an actionable offense, although primary liability may be asserted
against professionals who made actual false statements of fact or opinion).
117 148 CONG. REC. S7350-04 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Senator Paul S.
Sarbanes) (discussing how the Act is intentioned to restore integrity to the "fairest, most ef-
ficient and most transparent [financial markets] in the world.").
1i8 15 U.S.C.S. § 7262 (zoo5).
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weak control environments identified in corporate frauds perpetrated in
the late 198os and early I99os." 9 A commitment to fair financial reporting
is emphasized at the highest levels of a companyeffectively setting forth a
positive "tone at the top." 120 The attestation process of Section 404 is em-
phasized as a comprehensive review of a corporation's systems and control
structures, and as an ongoing process-not just a one-time review.' 2' The
goal is not only to foster current compliance with the new requirements
upon implementation but also to perpetually improve the overall quality
of financial information in the future.22 Once implemented, the internal
controls documentation obtained may actually lower the cost of continuing
compliance and improve the integration of effective controls in manage-
ment decision making.'
2 3
A. The Mechanics of Internal Controls
Consistent with the overarching audit committee goal of monitoring the
company's operations and financial reporting, internal control structures
are a first line of defense to prevent and detect accounting and report-
ing irregularities.24 An effective system of controls includes. both applica-
tion and monitoring measures.2 5 Application controls include "nuts and
bolts" systems for transaction approval, processing financial information,
and the production of internal and external reports.12 6 Typical controls of
this genre include required approvals, separation of key accounting and
reporting duties, and independent confirmation of accounts and transac-
tions.' 2 7 Monitoring controls, on the other hand, are designed to monitor
the proper operation of the application controls and alert management to
any deviation from routine procedure. 2s These controls are normally on a
higher level such as one member of management verifying that an account
119 The Committee ofSponsoring Organizations ("COSO") oftheTreadway Commission,
a private group sponsored by accounting and internal audit industry groups, compiled a report
of misstatements and restatements in the financial reports of public companies long before
the publicity of the massive frauds of the early 21st century. See COSO, Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1987-1997 An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies, at v. (1999).
120 See id. COSO advocates a documented, firmly established control structure involving
board members and senior executives, in order to help prevent the majority of corporate
frauds, which usually originate at the highest levels of company management.
121 Kudlow, supra note Ioi.
122 Id. (discussing implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley § 404 Internal Controls
Attestation).
123 Id.
124 Kirkendall, supra note 3,2310(2003).
125 See infra notes I I 7-32 and accompanying text.
126 BODNAR & HOPWOOD, supra note 92, at 187-92.
127 Id.
128 See Kudlow, supra note Ioi.
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reconciliation (an application control in itself) done by another individual
is performed regularly and properly.'2 9 While an effective control environ-
ment incorporates both application and monitoring controls designed from
the ground up as part of an integrated system, corporate board and audit
committee attention is more likely to be focused on monitoring controls.13
Toward this end, one of the audit committee's best weapons in ensuring
a strong control environment is the internal audit function. 3' Under the
exclusive control of the audit committee, internal auditors should analyze
appropriate controls on all levels, identifying weaknesses and proposing
changes where necessary without having to report through the levels of
financial managers that may have contributed to control weaknesses in the
first place.32
B. Internal Control Attestation Requirements in Other Industries
The internal controls assessment requirement as embodied in Sarbanes-
Oxley is not totally new. A separate opinion by external accountants, at-
testing to the existence and effectiveness of internal controls, has been
required for many years in audits of federal grants and expenditures under
the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-133 ("OMB A-133" ).133
Pursuant to these regulations, any person, agency, or organization receiving
federal grant funds in a single year over a threshold amount must have an
independent "single audit" conducted by a public accountant.'34 The opin-
ion rendered must include not only the fair presentation of the recipient's
financial statement amounts, but also whether or not management has in-
ternal control systems in place and operating effectively to ensure proper
compliance with grant requirements. I35 This requirement recognizes the
importance of control systems in monitoring the processes that organiza-
tions have in place to ensure the accurate and timely reporting of financial
information concerning the use of government funds.
Additionally, other highly regulated industries have been subject to
internal control attestation requirements in the past. Over-the-counter
("OTC") derivatives dealers must file a separate report with the SEC each
year indicating that they have an internal risk control system in place and
129 See Roth and Esperson, supra note 98.
13o Backer, supra note 12, at 359 (discussing the interconnected nature of controls
within the management structure, relating to their duty to report accurate and complete
information).
131 Fisher, supra note 19.
132 Id.
133 31 U.S.C. § 7502(e)(3) (2ooo), 29 C.ER. § 96.12 (2005).
134 31 U.S.C.S. § 7502(c) (2005).
135 31 U.S.C.S. § 7502(e)(3) (2005).
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that such systems have been documented and tested. 36 This management
certification must also be subjected to testing procedures by an indepen-
dent public accountant.' 37 Similarly, depository institutions under Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") regulation must submit a state-
ment signed by the chief executive officer and chief accounting or finan-
cial officer recognizing that management is responsible for implementing a
system of adequate internal controls for financial reporting and that such
controls are effective.3 8 Again, this statement must be subjected to testing
procedures by the company's independent accountants. 139 Thus, the exten-
sion of the internal control attestation requirements to a/l registered com-
panies places increased emphasis on concerns that have been recognized
by other industries and agencies for many years.' 40
Consistent with the theory that the audit committee, external auditors,
and corporate lawyers should serve as "gatekeepers" to prevent corporate
fraud,'14 the heightened involvement of the audit committee in the inter-
nal control attestation process provides a solid foundation for reform. This
involvement should focus the efforts of corporate reformers on scrutiniz-
ing the corporation's own systems and procedures from the ground-up and
from the inside-out at the earliest stage possible. An ounce of prevention
in the form of effective internal control has the potential to be one of the
most effective tools in corporate governance reform. By concentrating the
focus of reliable financial reporting on prevention and monitoring through
an enabled audit committee, corporate boards can provide efficient and
beneficial assurance that complete, accurate, and timely information is pro-
vided by the company to its stakeholders and the market at large.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although the ACFE requirements represent an important
step in recognizing the need for increased audit-committee financial lit-
eracy, the criteria do little to actually foster any effective change in practice
beyond simple compliance. As some foreign commentators have criticized
Sarbanes-Oxley as being implemented too quickly without full consid-
eration of available options, continued analysis and amendment should
136 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-12(l)(1) (2005).
137 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-I2(k) (2005).
138 12 U.S.C.S. § 183Im(b)(2) (2005).
139 Id.
140 See Kudlow, supra note ioi (discussing how Sarbanes-Oxley § 404 segregates and
places individual attention on internal controls as a worthy goal in and of themselves).
141 See generally Rutheford B Campbell and Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of
Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9 (2003).
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be considered.42 This author believes that the financial expert standards
should be modified to include broader metrics to evaluate audit committee
effectiveness and monitoring when applied to all board members. More
qualitative, company-specific factors should be considered in applying such
standards to the diverse situations encountered by corporate boards in dif-
ferent industries.43 Care should be taken to avoid undue reliance by other
audit committee members upon the advice and opinions of the ACFE. In
order for the rising tide of corporate governance and responsibility to lift all
boats, a higher level of financial sophistication should be demanded from
all board members. Instead of a disproportionate distribution of financial
knowledge wherein one committee member could be a genius while oth-
ers barely know the difference between assets and liabilities, a requisite
level of financial literacy and monitoring acumen should be demanded
from all. However, the current super-expert requirements of the ACFE are
probably not the most efficient standards by which to judge the required
level of literacy. A CPA or former CFO would definitely be desirable on the
audit committee, but the mere presence of these individuals does not au-
tomatically result in a higher level of audit committee effectiveness. More
importantly, audit committee members should be keen in their monitoring
abilities, in order to recognize situations where outside expert consultation
should be sought out, as part of the company's own defense against poten-
tial fraud or misstatement.' 44 This more enlightened, self-actualized audit
committee provides the basis on which to implement and refine a solid
internal control structure in close connection with the committee's duty of
monitoring.
The internal control attestation requirements should continue to be
given top priority as corporate boards and audit committees recognize the
importance of such controls as their first line of defense in upholding their
monitoring duties. By broadening the primary focus of an audit committee's
responsibilities from the ex-post emphasis on the external audit to the ex-
ante safeguards of internal controls, an effective early warning system can
be implemented. Internal controls emphasize the overarching goal of cor-
porate board members (to be diligent advocates protecting the interests of
the absentee shareholder and the market) by scrutinizing the corporation's
own processing of information for financial reporting. Once understood by
the investing public, such measures can greatly contribute to the overall
goal of corporate reforms: to restore confidence in the integrity of the most
robust financial markets in the world.' 45
142 John Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy HeardAround the World and the International
Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REv. 211, at 217 (2003).
143 Cook, supra note 14, at 1032.
144 Fisher, supra note 19, at 41.
145 Press Release, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Statement from SEC
Chairman Harvey L. Pitt (July 24, 2002), availabk at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/zoo2-
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i i i.htm (commenting that the impetus of the reforms is to restore integrity to the nations
financial markets and to serve the interests of U.S. investors).
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